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A SILENT SPRING IN DEEP WATER?: 
PROPOSING FRONT-END REGULATION OF 
DISPERSANTS AFTER THE DEEPWATER 
HORIZON DISASTER 
Christopher M. Iaquinto* 
Abstract: The unprecedented use of dispersants in response to the BP 
Deepwater Horizon blowout and subsequent explosion revealed the 
weaknesses of the current U.S. oil spill emergency response apparatus. 
The dearth of information regarding dispersant toxicity and effectiveness 
at various depths highlights the need to revisit the current procedures 
within the National Contingency Plan for responding to oil spill emer-
gencies. In assessing various options, the experience of pesticide regula-
tion is informative—a front-end regulatory framework like that employed 
in the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act could address 
many of the shortcomings of federal emergency spill response. Such a 
regulatory approach would ensure that information about dispersants is 
made available before their listing on the National Contingency Plan, 
rather than after their ultimate application. Given the risk for harm to 
human health and the environment from oil spills and subsequent dis-
persant application, such an approach is necessary. 
Introduction 
 President Obama labeled the BP Deepwater Horizon blowout and 
subsequent explosion on April 20, 2010 “the worst environ-mental disas-
ter America has ever faced.”1 The disaster killed eleven individuals work-
ing on the oil drilling platform, and caused the discharge of an estimated 
four million barrels of crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico.2 Roughly 1.84 
million gallons of dispersants—an unparalleled amount3—were used to 
                                                                                                                      
* Editor in Chief, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2011–12. 
1 Remarks by the President to the Nation on the BP Oil Spill ( June 15, 2010), available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-nation-bp-oil-spill. 
2 Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore Drilling, 
Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling, at vi 
(2011) [hereinafter BP Commission Report]. 
3 Id. “Dispersants are chemicals that can be used to break up oil and speed its natural 
degradation.” EPA, The Federal Government Response: Dispersant Use in BP Oil 
Spill ( July, 2010), http://www.epa.gov/bpspill/factsheets/dispersants-factsheet.pdf. 
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combat the released oil.4 Neither the government nor BP had much in-
formation concerning dispersant toxicity or the potential hazards result-
ing from applying this quantity of surface and subsurface dispersants.5 
 According to the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Ho-
rizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, dispersant application in response 
to this disaster is troubling for three reasons.6 First, 1.84 million gallons 
of dispersants were applied, exceeding the amount used in any other 
spill cleanup.7 Second, dispersant use at the wellhead began without 
any significant testing of either dispersant efficacy or possible environ-
mental consequences.8 Third, the federal government’s pre-approved 
response plans allowed for dispersant application in response to an oil 
spill without any constraints or guidelines on their use.9 
 This is not the first time potentially lethal poisons have been used 
to counter threats to society, public health, and the economy.10 Pesti-
cides have been used for over two thousand years, and have been 
known to contain harmful metals such as arsenic, lead, and copper, as 
well as dangerous synthetic chemicals such as organophosphates, which 
were originally used as nerve gases during World War II.11 Pesticides 
are now an integral part of our national and worldwide economy.12 
                                                                                                                      
 
4 Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore Drilling, The Use of 
Surface and Subsea Dispersants During the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill 1 (Working Paper No. 
4, 2011) [hereinafter Dispersant Working Paper]. Over one million gallons were applied on 
the surface, and 771,000 gallons were applied subsea. See id. 
5 Petition from Marianne Engelman Lado, Counsel, Earthjustice, to Lisa P. Jackson, 
Adm’r., EPA 2 (Oct. 13, 2010), available at http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/files/ 
dispersant_petition_0.pdf (requesting the promulgation of a rule addressing toxicity testing 
and disclosure of ingredients in dispersants). 
6 Dispersant Working Paper, supra note 4, at 1. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. Dispersants have been available as a means of spill response since the mid-1980s. Ker 
Than, Gulf Oil Spill Fight Turns to Chemicals: Team Hopes Oil Dispersants Will Limit Damage on 
Land, Nat’l Geographic Daily News (Apr. 30, 2010), http://news.nationalgeographic. 
com/news/2010/04/100430-energy-gulf-oil-spill-chemical-dispersants/. Counsel for BP, how-
ever, confirmed that surface application of dispersants was the only type of application 
method contemplated in the 1990s, the time of the latest revision to the National Contin-
gency Plan (NCP). Dispersant Working Paper, supra note 4, at 1 n.3; National Oil and Hazardous 
Substances Pollution Contingency Plan Overview, Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www.epa.gov/ 
oem/content/lawsregs/ncpover.htm (last updated Aug. 19, 2011) [hereinafter NCP Over-
view] (noting that “[t]he latest revisions to the NCP were finalized in 1994”). 
9 Dispersant Working Paper, supra note 4, at 1–2. 
10 See Mary Jane Angelo, Embracing Uncertainty, Complexity, and Change: An Eco-Pragmatic 
Reinvention of a First-Generation Environmental Law, 33 Ecology L.Q. 105, 108 (2006). 
11 Id. at 144, 146. 
12 See 2000–2001 Pesticide Market Estimates: Usage, Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www. 
epa.gov/opp00001/pestsales/01pestsales/usage2001.htm#3_1 (last updated May 9, 2012). 
More than 5 billion pounds of pesticides were used worldwide between 2000 and 2001, 
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 Consumer protection concerns originally motivated pesticide 
regulation.13 In the 1960s, social awareness of ecological threats posed 
by pesticides dramatically increased, due in large part to Rachel Car-
son’s book Silent Spring.14 As a result, Congress amended the Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) to address the po-
tential impacts of pesticides on users, consumers, and the environment, 
thus transforming the pesticide regulatory structure in the 1970s.15 FI-
FRA created a front-end regulatory framework by requiring disclosure 
of information about the pesticide before its registration and subse-
quent introduction to the market.16 Ultimately, FIFRA helped transi-
tion the focus of pesticide regulation from consumer fraud to the risks 
posed to human health and the environment.17 
 Although FIFRA has downsides and weaknesses, this Note argues 
that a FIFRA-like, front-end regulatory framework for dispersants would 
be socially beneficial. Specifically, this Note addresses some of the weak-
nesses of FIFRA while highlighting the benefits of a front-end frame-
work for dispersant regulation. Part I summarizes the factual under-
pinnings of dispersant application in the wake of the BP Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill and the National Contingency Plan—the existing 
federal emergency response structure and framework. Part II discusses 
the legislative intent behind FIFRA and the framework employed to 
achieve those ends. Part III compares dispersants and pesticides, and 
argues that, given the similarities between the two, a front-end regula-
tory framework similar to FIFRA should be introduced for dispersants. 
Additionally, this Note suggests alternatives to some of FIFRA’s methods 
to avoid the various pitfalls of current pesticide regulation. 
                                                                                                                      
with U.S. usage exceeding 1.2 billion pounds. Id. The United States exported roughly 400 
million pounds of pesticides over this two year period. Id. 
13 Harold R. Willson, Pesticide Regulations, in Radcliffe’s IPM World Textbook (E.B. 
Radcliffe et al. eds.), http://ipmworld.umn.edu/chapters/willson.htm (last visited May 18, 
2012). 
14 Angelo, supra note 10, at 155–56. See Paul Brooks, Foreword to Rachel Carson, Si-
lent Spring, at xi–xiv (25th Anniversary ed. 1987). 
15 Willson, supra note 13. See generally 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y (2006) (establishing the 
environmental components to pesticide control and regulation). 
16 See 7 U.S.C. § 136A(c); Zygmunt J.B. Plater et al., Environmental Law and 
Policy: Nature, Law, and Society 647–48 (4th ed. 2010). 
17 Willson, supra note 13. 
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I. The U.S. Response to the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil 
Explosion and Spill 
 The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contin-
gency Plan (National Contingency Plan, or NCP) “is the federal gov-
ernment’s blueprint for responding to both oil spills and hazardous 
substance releases.”18 It is the result of efforts to improve the efficiency 
of a nation-wide response to these disasters by promoting coordination 
between responders at various levels, both state and federal.19 Thus, the 
goal of the NCP is to provide for coordinated and effective action to 
minimize adverse impact from oil discharges and hazardous substance 
releases.20 The NCP thus set the federal framework to manage the BP 
Deepwater Horizon explosion and oil spill response effort.21 
 The NCP was originally created and implemented in 1968 as part 
of the response to the Torrey Canyon oil tanker spill.22 It established a 
system for reporting potential disasters, created a preventive plan for 
spill containment and remediation, established a response headquar-
ters, and formed response teams on both the national and regional 
level.23 These regional and federal response teams have become the 
National Response Team (NRT) and Regional Response Teams (RRT) 
through subsequent editions of the NCP.24 
 Although the NCP governs the federal response to an emergency 
oil spill or hazardous release, it also takes into account both regional 
and national concerns and addresses relationships between the various 
parties involved in the cleanup effort.25 While the NCP requires the 
Coast Guard to supervise oil spill cleanup, it does not anticipate that 
the Coast Guard will actually perform the cleanup or provide the nec-
                                                                                                                      
18 NCP Overview, supra note 8. 
19 Id. 
20 40 C.F.R. § 300.1 (2010). 
21 BP Commission Report, supra note 2, at 131. 
22 NCP Overview, supra note 8. The spill released roughly 31 million gallons of crude oil 
into the Atlantic Ocean and prompted the use of over 10,000 tons of dispersants in re-
sponse. Torrey Canyon Disaster Revisited, BBC Cornwall, http://news.bbc.co.uk/local/ 
cornwall/hi/people_and_places/nature/newsid_8753000/8753329.stm (last updated June 
22, 2010). 
23 NCP Overview, supra note 8. 
24 Id. RRTs are composed of individuals from both federal and state agencies, and are 
charged with developing Regional Contingency Plans and pre-authorization protocols for 
their specific region. BP Commission Report, supra note 2, at 265. Conversely, the NRT is 
composed of individuals from the sixteen federal agencies whose duty is to provide a coor-
dinated and prepared emergency response. Id. at 131. 
25 BP Commission Report, supra note 2, at 131; NCP Overview, supra note 8. 
2012] Employing a Front-End Regulatory Framework for Dispersants 423 
essary tools.26 Rather, the NCP attempts to burden the responsible 
party—in this situation, BP—unless there is a threat to public health 
and safety.27 “Federalizing” a spill—which occurs when the Coast Guard 
assumes responsibility for the cleanup—is less preferable as it requires 
the government to carry out and fund the response, and then seek re-
payment at a later date.28 As a result, both federal policy concerns and 
regional issues are represented, through the Coast Guard’s involve-
ment, the RRTs, and the responsible party, respectively.29 
A. National Oil Spill Response: The National Contingency Plan 
 The scope of the original NCP expanded over time, as Congress 
incorporated appropriate amendments with the passage of subsequent 
legislation, such as the Clean Water Act of 1972 (CWA), Superfund leg-
islation in 1980 (CERCLA), and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA-
90).30 The latest modifications to the NCP were published when Con-
gress passed OPA-90, which was enacted after the Exxon Valdez travesty 
exposed widespread failures in oil spill response.31 
 The CWA, as amended by OPA-90, provides the authority for the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to engage in emergency re-
sponse measures to oil spills.32 The changes to the NCP were aimed at 
improving spill response efficiency and increasing investment in spill 
prevention.33 The NCP was most directly affected by OPA-90’s revisions 
                                                                                                                      
26 BP Commission Report, supra note 2, at 132. 
27 Id. at 134–35. 
28 Id. 
29 See id. at 131. 
30 NCP Overview, supra note 8; see Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251–1376 (2006); 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, Pub. L. No. 
96-510, 94 Stat. 2797 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 
U.S.C.); Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. § 2701–2761 (2006). The CWA required that 
the NCP “include a framework for responding to hazardous substance spills as well as oil 
discharges.” NCP Overview, supra note 8. As a result of CERCLA, the NCP was modified to 
include releases at waste sites requiring emergency removal actions. Id. The passage of 
OPA-90 amended existing provisions of the CWA, which required the President to modify 
the NCP as a result. Revisions to the Facility Response Plan Rule, Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
http://www.epa.gov/oem/content/frps/frprevs.htm (last updated Jan. 27, 2011). 
31 See BP Commission Report, supra note 2, at 130 n.*. 
32 Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. § 2732(f)–(g); Oil Pollution Act Overview, Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, http://www.epa.gov/oem/content/lawsregs/opaover.htm (last updated Jan. 28, 
2011). 
33 National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Control Plan, 59 Fed. Reg. 47,384, 
47,384 (Sept. 15, 1994) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 300). 
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to CWA section 311,34 in which Congress explicitly contemplated using 
dispersants as part of the federal emergency response to oil spills.35 Sec-
tion 311(d)(2)(G) mandates the preparation of a schedule considering 
“dispersants, other chemicals, and other spill mitigating devices and 
substances, if any, that may be used in carrying out the [National Con-
tingency] Plan,”36 and “the quantities of such dispersant, other chemi-
cals, or other spill mitigating device or substance which can be used 
safely in such waters.”37 The President was charged with creating and 
publishing a NCP that established procedures and guidelines for the 
removal of spilled oil and other hazardous substances,38 a responsibility 
delegated to the EPA.39 The EPA established that its mandate was ac-
companied by environmental considerations: 
Congress’ primary intent in regulating products under the 
NCP Product Schedule is to protect the environment from 
possible deleterious effects caused by the application or use of 
these products. In looking at the long- and short-term effects 
on the environment of all spill mitigating devices and sub-
stances, EPA has concluded that chemical and bioremediation 
countermeasures pose the greatest threat for causing delete-
rious effects on the environment.40 
This inclusion of an environmental focus in the NCP Product Schedule 
mirrors the congressional emphasis within FIFRA on human health 
and environmental concerns.41 
1. Dispersants and the Decision to Use Them: A Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 The decision to use dispersants involves a cost-benefit analysis.42 As 
the National Research Council notes, “[d]ispersant application . . . 
represents a conscious decision to increase the hydrocarbon load (re-
sulting from a spill) on one component of the ecosystem (e.g., the wa-
                                                                                                                      
34 Id. For example, § 311(d) required the development and implementation of proce-
dures for “removing a worst case discharge of oil and for mitigating or preventing a sub-
stantial threat of such a discharge.” 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d). 
35 Clean Water Act § 311(d)(2)(G)(i), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(d)(2)(G)(i) (2006). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. § 1321(d)(2)(G)(iii). 
38 Id. § 1321(d)(1). 
39 Exec. Order No. 12,777 § 8(b), 56 Fed. Reg. 54,757, 54,768 (Oct. 18, 1991). 
40 National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Control Plan, 59 Fed. Reg. 47,384, 
47,406–07 (Sept. 15, 1994) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 300). 
41 See infra note 143 and accompanying text. 
42 See Dispersant Working Paper, supra note 4, at 3. 
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ter column) while reducing the load on another (e.g., coastal wet-
land).”43 As a result, the decision to apply dispersants necessitates trade-
offs between limiting the threats posed to shoreline and surface habi-
tats while increasing the threats to those habitats underneath the water 
surface and away from the shoreline.44 The National Research Council 
also establishes that this analysis must take into account competing 
variables, such as “the type of oil spilled . . . sea state and weather . . . 
degree of turbulence . . . and relative abundance and life stages of resi-
dent organisms.”45 
 Dispersants are analogous to dish detergent, dissipating oil into 
much smaller droplets.46 Breaking down oil into smaller particles—and 
thereby increasing the overall surface area of the oil—allows naturally 
existing microbes to break down it more effectively.47 It is not clear, 
however, that such microbes exist at the low temperatures of deepwater, 
such as at the Macondo wellhead.48 The smaller oil particles also remain 
suspended in the water column more easily because of their size.49 As a 
result, dispersants can mitigate the effects of an oil spill on affected 
animals and the shoreline.50 
 Although there are certain benefits to dispersant application, 
there are also costs and uncertainties.51 Because of their dissipating ef-
fect, dispersants may expose organisms living well below the surface to 
higher concentrations of oil than would have occurred without the use 
of dispersants.52 The small size of the dispersed oil droplets may also 
increase the threat to organisms because smaller droplets of oil have 
the potential to access physical areas that a large plume of oil could 
                                                                                                                      
43 Nat’l Research Council, Oil Spill Dispersants: Efficacy and Effects 2 
(2005). 
44 See id. 
45 Id. 
46 Eli Kintisch, Toxicity Aside, Dispersants Could Undermine Natural Oil-Eaters, ScienceIn-
sider (May 26, 2010, 3:07 PM), http://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2010/05/ 
toxicity-aside-dispersants-could.html. 
47 Id. Agencies often reference the anticipated increase of the oil’s biodegradation as a 
reason for using dispersants. Dispersant Working Paper, supra note 4, at 3. 
48 See Dispersant Working Paper, supra note 4, at 3–4. 
49 Id. at 3. 
50 Merv Fingas, Prince William Sound Reg’l Citizens’ Advisory Council, A Re-
view of Literature Related to Oil Spill Dispersants, 1997–2008, at 3 (2008), avail-
able at http://www.pwsrcac.org/docs/d0053000.pdf. 
51 Id. at iii. 
52 See Dispersant Working Paper, supra note 4, at 1. 
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not, such as within the larvae and shells of baby crabs.53 Additionally, 
there is a significant difference between the toxicity of chemically and 
physically dispersed oil.54 Many studies have found that the most toxic 
components of crude oil, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs),55 
are present in greater concentrations of oil subjected to chemical dis-
persants than physically dispersed oil.56 The increased levels of PAHs in 
the water column cause an increase in toxicity of chemically dispersed 
oil by ten to fifty times that of physically dispersed oil.57 
 Additionally, not all dispersants act alike.58 Different dispersants 
employ different types of chemicals to break apart the oil, resulting in 
adverse consequences on biodegradation.59 Another issue with dispers-
ant use is that there are many factors that influence dispersant effec-
tiveness, “including oil composition, sea energy, state of oil weathering, 
the type of dispersant used and the amount applied, temperature, and 
salinity of the water,” which is compounded by the fact that differently 
scaled tests yield different results.60 
 Dispersants may have a dramatic effect on public health.61 By de-
sign, dispersants break oil down into smaller drops.62 It is this charac-
teristic that makes them dangerous to organisms—dispersants can eas-
ily move through cell walls, multiple layers of skin, and other 
“protective barriers” of the human body used to safeguard vital or-
gans.63 By increasing absorption of harmful chemicals, dispersants have 
the effect of exacerbating exposure to toxic oil chemicals.64 Further, 
dispersants, in breaking down the oil, form micelles—molecules whose 
                                                                                                                      
53 Eli Kintisch, Five Ways Oil Drops Could Still Be Deadly to Gulf, ScienceInsider (Aug. 2, 
2010, 2:00 PM), http://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2010/08/five-ways-oil-drops-
could-still.html. 
54 Fingas, supra note 50, at 15. 
55 Kintisch, supra note 53. 
56 Fingas, supra note 50, at 15. 
57 Id. 
58 Dispersant Working Paper, supra note 4, at 4. 
59 Id. Specifically, dispersants that employ “ionic surfactants,” such as Corexit 9527 and 
9500, have been found to have detrimental effects on biodegradation of the oil, whereas 
dispersants with “non-ionic surfactants” may have the opposite effect. Id. 
60 Fingas, supra note 50, at 4–5. Dispersants do not dissolve the oil; rather, “they 
change the chemical and physical properties of the oil, making it more likely to mix into 
the water column than to contaminate the shoreline.” Than, supra note 8. 
61 See Kathleen Burns & Michael R. Harbut, Sciencecorps, Gulf Oil Spill Health 
Hazards 14 (2010), available at http://www.sciencecorps.org/Gulf_Spill_Chemical_Haz 
ards_Report.pdf. 
62 Kintisch, supra note 46. 
63 Burns & Harbut, supra note 61, at 14. 
64 Id. at 39. 
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exterior consists of dispersant chemicals and interior is composed of 
oil.65 This combination of substances, oil and dispersant chemicals, 
poses a significant threat if human’s inhale the micelles.66 Micelles may 
coat the lungs, resulting in serious chest, head, and respiratory prob-
lems.67 The fact that the oil is dispersed, however, compounds the situa-
tion as it becomes more difficult to identify oil in water and therefore 
to prevent against additional exposure.68 
                                                                                                                     
 Although the decision to utilize dispersants addresses competing 
variables, little is known about their effectiveness in real-world applica-
tions.69 When dispersants are used, there is generally little documenta-
tion about the effects, and scientific testing is rarely executed.70 There 
have been roughly 213 recorded applications of dispersants on oil spills 
in the last 43 years.71 Only half of these dispersant applications were 
concluded to be effective, whereas the other half were found to be inef-
fective, inconclusive, or undocumented.72 
2. Dispersants in the NCP 
 Under Subpart J of the NCP—which requires the EPA to maintain 
a “schedule” of dispersants73—RRTs and Area Committees (ACs) must 
consider the relative advantages and disadvantages of the use of dis-
persants and other spill mitigating agents on the NCP Product Sched-
ule.74 These groups are then to submit Regional Contingency Plans 
(RCPs) and Area Contingency Plans (ACPs), respectively.75 In applying 
 
 
65 Id. at 15. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 16. 
69 See Fingas, supra note 50, at 4. 
70 Id. at 27. 
71 Id. at 26. 
72 Id. 
73 National Contingency Plan Product Schedule, Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www.epa. 
gov/ceppo/web/content/ncp/product_schedule.htm (last updated May 15, 2012) [here-
inafter NCP Product Schedule]. Currently, there are nineteen listed dispersants on the Prod-
uct Schedule. Id. By comparison, there are roughly nineteen thousand pesticides currently 
on the market. Linda-Jo Schierow, Cong. Research Serv., Pesticide Law: A Summary 
of the Statutes 1 (2004), available at https://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/04dec/ 
RL31921.pdf. 
74 40 C.F.R. § 300.910(a) (2010). 
75 Id. pt. 300, app. E § 4.1.3(b)–(c). While there is a distinction between the RCP and 
ACP, they are to generally include information concerning the “useful facilities and re-
sources in the region” from a variety of sources. Id. § 4.1.2. These are not to be confused 
with BP’s plans that infamously included a reference to walruses and provided a link to a 
Japanese entertainment site instead of the Marine Spill Response Corporation. BP Com-
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to the EPA for pre-authorization of spill response plans, RRTs and ACs 
must include the contexts and limits of dispersant usage in their RCPs 
and ACPs.76 A group consisting of the EPA’s representative on the RRT, 
the state representatives from those states with jurisdiction over the wa-
ters to which the plan applies, and the natural resource trustees from 
both the Department of Commerce (DOC) and Department of the In-
terior (Interior) determines whether pre-approval is appropriate.77 Pre-
approval allows for the On-Site Coordinator (OSC) to use products in 
the pre-authorization plan in an emergency response without obtaining 
“specific concurrences” from the aforementioned individuals.78 
 If a hazardous substance release occurs within an area where there 
is no appropriate pre-approved RCP, the OSC must obtain the concur-
rence of the DOC and Interior natural resource trustees, the EPA, and 
the state representatives with jurisdiction over the waters threatened by 
the spill to use dispersants already listed on the NCP Product Sched-
ule.79 However, in extreme situations that threaten or present a sub-
stantial threat to human life, the OSC may authorize the use of any dis-
persant, including those not listed on the NCP Product Schedule.80 
Outside of these situations, a dispersant’s presence on the NCP Product 
Schedule puts it into the pool of potential oil spill mitigating agents 
that may be used in an oil spill response.81 
 For a dispersant to be listed on the NCP Product Schedule, certain 
data requirements must be satisfied.82 These requirements include 
identification of a dispersant’s “components” and dispersant effective-
ness.83 The EPA requires that the manufacturer of the dispersant item-
ize the dispersant components by their chemical name and relative 
concentration based on weight within the product’s final formula-
tion.84 The manufacturer must also identify the dominant active ingre-
                                                                                                                      
mission Report, supra note 2, at 133. These oil spill response plans were a requirement 
from the Minerals Management Service (MMS) to facilitate oil spill cleanup. Id. at 83. 
MMS’s own regulations provide that the required response plan must be consistent with 
the appropriate ACP. 30 C.F.R. § 254.5 (2010). 
76 40 C.F.R. § 300.910(a). 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. § 300.910(b). 
80 Id. § 300.910(d). 
81 See id. § 300.910(a)–(b). 
82 See 40 C.F.R. § 300.915(a). 
83 Id. § 300.915(a)(7), (10). 
84 Id. § 300.915(a)(10). Additionally, the regulations require that percentages “include 
maximum, minimum, and average weights in order to reflect quality control variations in 
manufacture or formulation.” Id. 
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dients for “surface active agents,” “solvents,” and “additives.”85 Manu-
facturers, however, may use a “confidential business information” ex-
ception to withhold certain information from these technical data 
submissions.86 
 Manufacturers are also required to submit test results of dispersant 
effectiveness, obtained from “Swirling Flask effectiveness test methods,” 
which must be verified.87 In order to qualify for the NCP Product 
Schedule, a dispersant must show an effectiveness value of forty-five 
percent or more.88 For those dispersants satisfying the effectiveness re-
quirement, dispersant toxicity information obtained from “standard 
toxicity test methods” identified in Subpart C of the NCP is required,89 
along with verification of results and supporting data.90 This “Revised 
Standard Dispersant Toxicity Test” involves exposing two fish species, 
                                                                                                                      
85 Id. 
86 Id. § 300.920(c). Similarly, Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS)—a form required by 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration that contains information about the 
properties of certain ingredients in chemicals—allow for companies to characterize rather 
than specify classes of ingredients. Burns & Harbut, supra note 61, at 16. For example, for 
the Corexit products listed on the NCP, the manufacturer identified “organic sulfonic acid 
salts” and “petroleum distillates, hydrotreated light” as components without any further 
specifity. Id. This terminology limits the feasibility of forecasting the potential long-term 
effects of dispersant application. Id. BP, in attempting to find alternatives to Corexit 9500, 
noted that it would be valuable to obtain chemical formulas for other dispersants to dis-
cern which of the dispersants would be the safest and most appropriate alternative. Dis-
persant Working Paper, supra note 4, at 9. BP also stated that “there may be only limited in-
formation on the constituents of the dispersants, since the dispersants typically contain 
proprietary substances whose identities are not publicly available.” Letter from Douglas J. 
Suttles, BP, to Rear Admiral Landry, Commander, Eighth Coast Guard Dist., and Samuel 
Coleman, Dir., Superfund Div., Envtl. Prot. Agency Region 6, attachment pt. IV.E (May 20, 
201
nsists of placing seawater 
and
. pt. 300, app. C § 2.1. 
20. Subpart C “summarizes emergency preparedness activities 
rela
0), available at http://www.epa.gov/bpspill/dispersants/5–21bp-response.pdf. As of 
October 13, 2010, fifteen of eighteen listed dispersants claimed a privilege as to at least 
some of the ingredients. See Lado, supra note 5, at 4. 
87 40 C.F.R. § 300.915(a)(7). The “Swirling Flask” method co
 a surface oil layer in a modified Erlenmeyer flask, swirling it on a “shaker table” for 
twenty minutes, allowing it to rest for ten minutes, and then analyzing a sample of the 
subsurface swirled water for oil content. Id
88 Id. § 300.915(a)(7). Manufacturers of dispersants are also “encouraged to provide 
data on product performance under conditions other than those captured by these tests,” 
but such information is not required. Id. 
89 See id. §§ 300.200–.2
ting to discharges of oil,” discusses contingency planning, and addresses coordination 
between state and local responses to such releases. Id. § 300.200. 
90 Id. § 300.915(a)(7). 
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m d shrimp and silversides, to five combinations of varying concen-
trations of the test product (the dispersant) and oil.
ysi
 temperatures, byproducts, and endocrine effects.”94 Barring 
e 
gulatory approach is to provide ge-
neric information for the various dispersants so that they may be com-
pared
                                                                                                                     
91 
 The EPA makes the final determination as to whether a dispersant 
is published on the Product Schedule, and may refuse publication on 
several grounds, including significant variance from independent test 
verification and lack of qualification of a verifying laboratory.92 There is 
no additional toxicity threshold or requirement for a dispersant to be 
included on the Product Schedule.93 Toxicity testing data submitted to 
the EPA does not require “other important matters such as environ-
mental persistence, effectiveness with multiple varieties of oil and at 
multiple
th EPA’s refusal, once these criteria are submitted a dispersant may be 
listed.95 
 The EPA expressly disclaims any approval or certification of the 
listed product on the Product Schedule.96 Additionally, the EPA in-
cludes instructions that manufacturers are not to reference the dispers-
ant’s presence on the Product Schedule without printing a pre-written 
disclaimer that reemphasizes the fact that presence on the Product 
Schedule does not constitute any type of acceptance on behalf of the 
EPA.97 Rather, as the warning establishes, presence on the Product 
Schedule only notes the submission of the product’s technical data to 
the EPA.98 The purpose of this re
 against one another on a national basis.99 
 
91 Id. pt. 300, app. C § 3.1. This is done to identify the mortality rates of the silversides 
afte rimp after forty-eight hours. Id. These are considered 
acu  tests. Dispersant Working Paper, supra note 4, at 6. 
aper, supra note 4, at 6. 
.F.R. § 300.915(a)(12). 
 versions 
is d
 dispersant’s use. See id. 
ution Control Plan, 59 Fed. Reg. 47,384, 
47,4 t. 15, 1994) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 300). 
r ninety-six hours and mysid sh
te toxicity
92 40 C.F.R. § 300.915(a)(12). 
93 See id. 
94 Dispersant Working P
95 40 C
96 Id. § 300.920(e). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. Access to the NCP Product Schedule is provided through the EPA’s website, in 
both web and PDF form. See NCP Product Schedule, supra note 73. Absent from both
ata concerning appropriate or safe amounts of the dispersant to use and potential envi-
ronmental or public health risks presented by that specific
99 National Oil and Hazardous Substances Poll
11 (Sep
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B. Dispersant Usage in Response to the BP Deepwater Horizon Spill 
 The EPA Administrator, Lisa Jackson, approved the use of dispers-
ants in response to the BP spill.100 Jackson acknowledged that the deci-
sion was difficult, due in part to the challenges and trade-offs posed by 
dispersant usage and the minimal amount of available information.101 
The federal response to the BP Deepwater Horizon explosion and sub-
sequent spill began in the evening of April 20, 2010.102 The RCPs ap-
plicable to the well’s location were for EPA Regions 4 and 6.103 Both 
relevant RCPs for the Macondo wellhead operation pre-authorized the 
use of certain specified dispersants, and neither prescribed constraints 
concerning the overall amount or length of time for which dispersants 
could be used.104 On May 1, after roughly BP’s response crews applied 
roughly 140,000 gallons of dispersants to the Gulf of Mexico’s surface, 
they began applying dispersants to the subsurface.105 There was confu-
sion as to whether subsurface application of dispersants required addi-
tional process and approval from the various federal administrators in 
charge of the federal response.106 Subsurface application of dispersants 
continued at the wellhead until May 20, 2010.107 
 At that point, the Coast Guard and the EPA notified BP that it 
must “identify and use a less toxic and more effective dispersant than 
Corexit 9500 from the list of dispersants authorized by the [NCP].”108 If 
unable to do so, BP had to provide both federal entities with an in-
depth account of the alternate products investigated and an explana-
tion as to why these were not improvements over Corexit 9500, the 
product currently in use.109 BP responded that Corexit 9500A was the 
best alternative.110 Administrator Jackson, in response to BP’s reply, re-
vealed that “federal regulators remained ‘deeply concerned about the 
things we don’t know’ such as the ‘long-term effect on aquatic life.’”111 
                                                                                                                      
t Working Paper, supra note 4, at 8. 
vtl. Prot. Agency, 
http sited May 18, 2012). Each region is in 
char menting the Agency’s programs and initiatives. Id. 
ersant Working Paper, supra note 4, at 6. 
sis added). By this time, 580,000 gallons of dispersant were applied on 
the re applied subsurface. Id. 
t 8–9. 
rking Paper, supra note 4, at 9. 
100 Dispersan
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 6. 




105 Id. at 7. 
106 Id. 
107 See id. at 8. 
108 Id. (empha
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Additionally, Jackson stated that the EPA was instructing BP to reduce 
its use of dispersants potentially by fifty or seventy-five percent.112 Be-
nt 
sts.
other dispersants available for use on the NCP Product Schedule.121 
 
                                                                                                                     
lieving that BP’s own analysis of potential dispersant alternatives was 
too minimal,113 the EPA announced that it “would perform its own tests 
to verify BP’s data and to ‘determine the least toxic, most effective dis-
persant available in the volumes necessary for a crisis of this magni-
tude.’”114 
 On May 26, 2010, the EPA and the Coast Guard issued a directive 
to BP that required the elimination of surface application of dispers-
ants except where there might be extenuating circumstances necessitat-
ing an exemption.115 Despite this joint directive, the use of surface dis-
persants continued at near forty percent of the pre-directive rate for 
another month.116 Representative Edward J. Markey wrote a letter to 
the head of the U.S. Coast Guard, Admiral Thad W. Allen, concerning 
the use of dispersants.117 Representative Markey noted that the Coast 
Guard and the EPA approved seventy-four exemption requests over a 
span of forty-eight days.118 On June 30, sixteen days before the well was 
finally capped, the EPA published its conclusions from these dispersa
te 119 Eight dispersants were subjected to acute toxicity tests that only 
considered the toxicity of the dispersants themselves, not the combined 
effect of the oil and dispersant once applied.120 The EPA concluded 
that Corexit 9500A did not pose any greater threat than any of the 
The Macondo well was capped on July 15, 2010, after which dis-
persant usage ceased.122 Over roughly three months, 1.84 million gal-
 
. 
y, Remarks at Press Briefing (May 12, 2010), http://epa.gov/bpspill/dispers 
ants anscript-final.pdf. 




112 Id. at 9–10
113 Id. at 10. 
114 Id. In a May 12, 2010 press briefing, Administrator Jackson stated that “toxicity testing 




116 Id. at 11. 
117 Letter from Rep. Edward J. Markey, Chairman, Subcomm. on Energy & Env’t, U.S. 
House of Representatives, to Admiral Thad W. Allen, Na
st Guard 4 ( July 30, 2010), available at http://m
persants.pdf. 
118Id. 
119 Dispersant Working Paper, supra note 4, at 10, 12. 
120 Id. at 10. 
121 EPA’s Toxicity Testing of Dispersants, Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www.epa.gov/ 
bpspill/dispersants-testing.html (last visited May 18, 2012). 
122 Dispersant Working Paper, supra note 4, at 




of DDT in animals and the result-
ing long-term effects throughout the food chain.131 DDT’s effect on the 
food chain is considered for the tremendous de-
ine
                                                                                                                     
s of dispersants were dumped in the Gulf, with just over 1 millio
ga ns applied on the surface and 771,000 gallons to the subsurface.123 
II. Pesticides and Dispersants: Two Peas from the Same Pod 
 In considering the regulation of a young technology such as dis-
persants, it is helpful to examine the regulation of pesticides, a much 
older technology.124 Like dispersants, pesticides can both provide great 
benefits and cause extreme harm.125 For example, the notorious pesti-
cide dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT) saved thousands of lives 
during World War II by preventing the spread of malaria and typhu
Over time, it developed into a popular, widely used general pesticide in 
the agricultural economy.127 During the 1950s, DDT application reached 
roughly six thousand tons per year in the United States.128 
 The publication of Rachel Carson’s book Silent Spring, however, 
addressed the threats posed by DDT use.129 The book raised awareness 
of DDT’s role in killing beneficial as well as harmful insects.130 Carson 
also discussed the bioaccumulation 
 largely responsible 
cl  of the American bald eagle.132 
A. FIFRA’s Beginning 
 FIFRA is the statutory mechanism that allows the EPA to regulate 
the pesticide market.133 Originally passed in 1947, FIFRA creates prod-
 
BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore 
Dril uded that the government “was not adequately prepared for the use of dis-
persants to address such a large oil spill.” Id. In addition, the Commission found that the 
EPA r “in its roles on the National Response Team and the relevant Re-
gion onse Teams, the possibility that dispersants might have to be used in the mas-
sive volumes of dispersants 
mig Id. at 13. 
ngelo, supra note 10, at 144–47. 
d. 
 
123 Id. The National Commission on the 
ling concl
 did not conside
al Resp
 volumes required,” or “the distinct possibility that massive 
ht be needed at the subsea level.” 
124 See A
125 See i
126 See id. 
127 See id. at 155. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. See generally Carson, supra note 14. 
130 Angelo, supra note 10, at 155. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Plater et al., supra note 16, at 648. FIFRA replaced the Insecticide Act of 1910. 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www. 
epa.gov/oecaagct/lfra.html# (last updated May 4, 2012) [hereinafter FIFRA Summary]. The 
434 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 39:419 
uct licensing requirements that operate at the “front end” of the regu-
latory process, regulating the product before it is injected into the 
marketplace.134 In regulating at this juncture of the product’s lifespan, 
e producer.140 To complement this burden-shifting, the 
PA
FRA—the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act—requires the 
the EPA may “prohibit the introduction of new products, or the further 
sales of existing products, when such products might conceivably be 
hazardous to human health or the environment.”135 
 Between 1972 and 1996, FIFRA underwent its first in a series of sig-
nificant amendments.136 The 1972 changes to FIFRA created separate 
classifications for pesticides—restricted and general use.137 Additionally, 
the 1972 amendments altered the manner in which pesticides were reg-
istered, to include more information about the pesticide during the reg-
istration process.138 This change allowed for better evaluation of poten-
tial harms and hazards of pesticides to public and environmental 
health.139 The burden of providing information shifted from the gov-
ernment to th
E  developed a system for ensuring the legitimacy of the independent 
institutions used by industry to produce and collect the necessary in-
formation.141 
 As presently constructed, FIFRA expressly authorizes the EPA “to: 
(1) strengthen the registration process by shifting the burden of proof 
to the chemical manufacturer, (2) enforce compliance against banned 
and unregistered products, and (3) promulgate the regulatory frame-
work missing from the original law.”142 The latest amendment to FI-
                                                                                                                      
1910 Act originated as an attempt to provide economic and competitive protection to limit 
“the misbranding and adulteration of pesticide[s].” Va. Tech. Pesticide Programs, 1910 Insec-
ticide Act, Va. Tech., http://agnew111.ext.vt.edu:8080/Plone/museum-of-pest-management/ 
early-pesticide-laws-and-regulations/1910-insecticide-act/ (last visited May 18, 2012). 
134 Plater et al., supra note 16, at 647. This approach runs opposite to a “back-end” 
o existence. Id. Hazardous waste sites controlled under CERCLA legislation are a 
com xample of regulations utilizing such a strategy. See id; 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9626 
(20
. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 (codified as amended in 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y (2006)). 
l Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 
973
d. 





136 FIFRA Summary, supra note 133. 





140 Willson, supra note 13. 
141 Id. 
142 7 U.S.C. § 136a; FIFRA Summary, supra note 133. 
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EPA to treat the protection of human health and preservation of the 
environment as its chief concerns in regulating the pesticide market.143 
B. FIFRA’s Registration Process 
 Through the registration process, the EPA maintains control over 
 pesa ticide’s market access, and thus its potential distribution and sale 
in the United States.144 FIFRA requires that an applicant file a state-
ment with the EPA that consists of, among other things, “a complete 
copy  be 
mad , and any directions for its use.”145 In addition, FIFRA re-
quir sti-
cide e results thereof 
upon
 est must be given by 
the A




takin l, and environmental costs and 
                                                                                                                     
 of the labeling of the pesticide, a statement of all claims to
e for it
es that the producer submit “the complete formula of the pe
”146 and “a full description of the tests made and th
 which the claims are based.”147 
Approval of an application’s registration requ
dministrator if: 
(A) its composition is such as to warrant the proposed claims 
for it; 
(B) its labeling and other material required to be submitted 
comply with the requirements of this subchapter; 
(C) it will perform its intended function without unreason-
able adverse effects on the environment; and 
(D) when used in accordance with widespread and commonly 
erse effects on the environment.148 
“Unreasonable adverse effects on the environment” are def
n the Act as “any unreasonable risk to man or the environm
g into account the economic, socia
 
110 Stat. 1492 (1996) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y). 
006). The first paragraph of section 3 states: 
143 Pub. L. No. 104-170, 
144 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (2
[ o person in any State may distribute or sell to any person any pesticide 
that is not registered under this subchapter. To the extent necessary to pre-
vent unreasonable adverse effects on the environment, the Administrator may 
by regulation limit the distribution, sale, or use in any State of any pesticide 
that is not registered under this subchapter. 
Id. 
145 Id. § 136a(c)(1)(C). 
146 Id. § 136a(c)(1)(D). 
147 Id. § 136a(c)(1)(F). 
148 Id. § 136a(c)(5)(A). 
N]
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benefits of the use of any pesticide.”149 Thus, FIFRA’s framework incor-
porates a cost-benefit analysis.150 Indeed, it was Congress’s intention to 
have the EPA regulate pesticides in an intelligent fashion, conscien-
outi sly weighing potential benefits against potential risks of pesticide 
use.151 
 Some commentators suggest that FIFRA’s registration policies ul-
timately create a unique licensing statute.152 One commentator notes 
that because it is more efficient and cost-effective for manufacturers to 
develop toxicology information for their products than it is for the EPA 
to do the same, it is wise to have the manufacturer bear responsibility 
for toxicology information.153 The EPA typically establishes a licensing 
scheme to shift costs in this way.154 As it pertains to pesticides and other 
toxic substances, licensing requires the producer to demonstrate the 
safety of its product before introduction to the market.155 Thus, the 
producer or manufacturer has the burden of providing information 
verifying the product’s safety and revealing its toxic components and 
effects.156 As a result, the EPA has the ability to acquire all data that may 
be necessary to determine whether a chemical poses an unreasonable 
risk by simply requiring that data in the registration process.157 Because 
the data requirements apply to the pesticide, and not just to the indi-
                                                                                                                      
149 Id. § 136(bb). 
150 See 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb). Cost-benefit analysis can be understood as a
achieve the equilibrium point between one’s willingness to spend and anot
n attempt to 
her’s willing-
ness to provide at certain costs. See Angelo, supra note 10, at 121. Some commentators note 
the potential defects with utilizing risk analysis as it pertains to pesticide regulation. 
Plater et al., supra note 16, at 659–60. Problems include the EPA’s reliance “on the data 
generated by pesticide manufacturers—raising opportunities for various types of bias” 
 for the EPA to take action against pesticides “effec-
tive
elter from public scrutiny and yet prolong the longevity of pesticides that may 
be n
reasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory Policy, and 
Toxi nces Control, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 261, 269 (1991) (quoting S. Rep. No. 92-838, at 
4 (1
 et al., supra note 16, at 657. 
 supra note 151, at 308. 
because of EPA’s inability to independently verify and produce contesting data. Donald T. 
Hornstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide Regulation on the Paradigms and Politics of Environ-
mental Law Reform, 10 Yale J. on Reg. 369, 436 (1993). “In short, the risk assessment en-
terprise is so information intensive that it creates strategic incentives to avoid a serious 
scientific examination of ‘true’ levels of public health and environmental risk.” Id. at 437. 
Additionally, the risk analysis required
ly inoculate[s] manufacturers against timely action.” Id. at 438. Finally, “risk analysis 
offers the conceptual umbrella of ‘science’ under which numerous non-scientific values 
can take sh
either desirable nor needed.” Id. 







156 See id. 
157 Id. at 309. 
2012] Employing a Front-End Regulatory Framework for Dispersants 437 
vi al chemical components, the EPA can more efficiently request ad-
ditional information concerning environmental and public health ef-
fects of a product.
du
ion system,” such as the 
one a licensing scheme produces, may occur.164 To address this poten-
tial informati nce passed, 
rce
akes a 
final determination regarding that pesticide’s registration, there is a 
 in which the pesticide can remain on the market.168 
anc
158 Presumably, the EPA can effectively uncover all 
potential biases of the manufacturer by requesting information and 
developing accurate and meaningful data on the product.159 
 Some commentators suggest that this type of approach has poten-
tial disadvantages.160 As one commentator notes, the licensing scheme 
only affects the product at the moment of its registration with the 
EPA.161 Early in a product’s lifespan, little is known about the product’s 
chemicals and their long-term effects.162 Further, the licensing scheme 
only operates proactively.163 Because FIFRA does not retroactively ad-
dress existing pesticides and their chemical components, it is possible 
that “a major gap in an information generat
on gap, FIFRA created a five-year term that, o
fo s the EPA to reevaluate the registered pesticide.165 The Agency, 
overburdened, is unable to aggressively enforce this power and has not 
sufficiently addressed the information gap.166 
C. FIFRA’s Recourse: Cancellation & Suspension 
 The EPA may restrict a pesticide’s access to the market by cancel-
ing or suspending that pesticide’s registration.167 Until the EPA m
pendency period
C ellation turns on an analysis of whether or not the risks are rea-
sonable.169 Suspension, however, is an immediate ban, either with no-
tice or ex parte, on pesticides presenting an imminent hazard.170 
                                                                                                                      
158 Id. Increasing the ability of the EPA to request additional information on a pesti-
cide is the rather “general justification” for these requests, “given the breadth of factors 
relevant to the unreasonable risk determination.” Id; see 7 U.S.C. § 136a (2006). 
te, supra note 151, at 309. 
51, at 312. 
w Handbook 284, 290 (Thomas 
F.P. § 136a-1. 
1, at 313. 
)(ii)–(iv). 
, at 300–01; 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(2)(B)(iv). 
159 See Applega
160 Id. at 310. 
161 Id. at 312; see 7 U.S.C. § 136a. 
162 Applegate, supra note 1
163 Id.; see 7 U.S.C. § 136a. 
164 Applegate, supra note 151, at 312. 
165 Marshall L. Miller, Pesticides, in Environmental La
Sullivan ed., 14th ed. 1997); see 7 U.S.C. 
166 Applegate, supra note 15
167 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b)–(c). 
168 Miller, supra note 165, at 299; see 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(2)(B
169 See Miller, supra note 165, at 299; 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(3). 
170 Miller, supra note 165
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1. Cancellation 
 The EPA has the right to cancel a product’s registration “if it ap-
pears . . . that a pesticide or its labeling or other material required . . . 
does not comply with the [requirements] or . . . generally causes unrea-
sonable adverse effects on the environment.”171 Cancellation is the 
process by which the EPA can start to review a substance that potentially 
presents a “substantial question of safety to man or the environment.”172 
Cancellation hearings can extend over months or even years.173 
 The EPA-initiated cancellation process can occur as a result of two 
types of risks—dietary and other,174 only the latter of which is relevant 
to a comparison with dispersants. To cancel for “other risks” the EPA 
must only show that the risks of pesticide use are unreasonable when 
compared against their benefits.175 There are two types of cancellation 
actions available to the EPA—the first simply requires notice of cancel-
tio 176la n,  while the second provides notice of intent to hold a hearing 
to determine whether cancellation should occur.177 The EPA bears the 
burden of producing information as to why cancellation is warranted, 
and must ultimately substantiate its conclusions with proof.178 To make 
this determination, the EPA Administrator uses a cost-benefit analysis 
that incorporates “the economic, social, and environmental costs and 
benefits” from that pesticide’s use.179 
 The EPA begins the cancellation process by contacting the Secre-
tary of Agriculture and the FIFRA Scientific Advisory Panel with a draft 
Notice of Intent to Cancel and an accounting of the effects of the can-
cellation on those using the product for agricultural purposes.180 Based 
on the Secretary’s comment or response, the EPA can publish its pro-
posal to cancel the pesticide in the Federal Register.181 Although the 
can y days after notice is given, the registrant 
                                                                                                                     
cellation takes effect thirt
 
012) [hereinafter 
Pest y risks may occur if the EPA determines that 
the icide are greater than the “reasonable certainty of no harm 
stan cides used on food. Id.; see 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b). 
). 
at 308–09. 
te 174; see 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b). 
171 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b). 
172 Miller, supra note 165, at 299. 
173 Id. 
174 Pesticide Cancellation Under EPA’s Own Initiative, Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www. 
epa.gov/pesticides/regulating/cancellations.htm (last updated May 9, 2
icide Cancellation]. Cancellation for dietar
risks presented by the pest
dard” applied to pesti
175 Pesticide Cancellation, supra note 174. 
176 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b)(1
177 Id. § 136d(b)(2). 
178 Applegate, supra note 151, 
179 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb). 
180 Pesticide Cancellation, supra no
181 Id.; see 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b). 
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has the opportunity to request a trial-like hearing process.182 During 
the cancellation process, a product may be manufactured and sold 
without restriction until a final decision is reached.183 
 In 1985, the EPA initiated a Special Review Process to streamline 
the cancellation process.184 This process was created to guarantee that 
the EPA’s cost-benefit analyses were scrutinized and completed respon-
sibly, exposing their actions to the public eye.185 Under this framework, 
the party favoring registration always bears the “burden of persuasion” 
that a pesticide should be registered or reregistered.186 According to 
the EPA, the process “determines whether some or all registrations of a 
particular active ingredient or ingredients meet the federal standard 
, or whether amendment or cancellation of portions or 
l o
ited hearing 
                                                                                                                     
for registration
al f the registrations is appropriate.”187 
2. Suspension 
 The EPA may also suspend the registration of a pesticide.188 This 
decision takes effect immediately and ceases further sale of the prod-
uct.189 The EPA can use either “ordinary” or “emergency” suspension 
procedures.190 “Ordinary” suspensions may not occur unless the Ad-
ministrator has already issued a notice of intent to cancel, as discussed 
above.191 This may only be done if an “imminent hazard” —a substan-
tial likelihood of serious harm during the duration of the cancellation 
proceedings—exists.192 Manufacturers whose products are subject to a 
suspension have the opportunity to request an exped
 
182 Pesticide Cancellation, supra note 174. If no hearing is requested, the cancellation be-
com
supra note 165, at 299; see 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b)(2). 
 § 154.1 (2010). 
erate the EPA’s cancellation process, now average upwards of seven 
year
(c); Suspension of Registrations Under FIFRA Section 3(c)(2)(B), Envtl. 
Pro htm (last 
upd
gistrations Under FIFRA Section 3(c)(2)(B), supra note 188. 
es final. 7 U.S.C. § 136d(b)(2). 
183 Miller, 
184 See 40 C.F.R.
185 See id. 
186 Id. § 154.5. 
187 Special Review Process, Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www.epa.gov/oppsrrd1/special_ 
review/ (last updated May 17, 2012). In the last forty years, the EPA has reviewed just up-
wards of one hundred pesticides through this process. Id. Special Review proceedings, origi-
nally intended to accel
s, an average increase of five years from the original cancellation proceedings. Hornstein, 
supra note 150, at 438. 
188 7 U.S.C. § 136d
t. Agency, http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/regulating/registering/suspensions.
ated May 9, 2012). 
189 See Suspension of Re
190 7 U.S.C. § 136d(c)(1), (3). 
191 Id. § 136d(c)(1). 
192 Angelo, supra note 10, at 170; see 7 U.S.C. § 136d(c)(1). 
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wi in five days of receiving the notice of the intent to suspend.th
nsion operates 
like an application for a permanent injunction.197 The purpose of both 
susp the 
ar
lowed for the application 
 w
193 The 
suspension order does not become effective until notification has been 
given and there has been an opportunity for a hearing.194 
 An “emergency suspension” is the strongest power Congress 
granted to the EPA under FIFRA.195 It allows the EPA to suspend the 
product before notice to the manufacturer is given, thus making it an ex 
parte action.196 In this respect, a suspension proceeding is like a motion 
for a preliminary injunction, and an emergency suspe
ension actions is to allow the EPA to fast-track removal from 
m ket of a pesticide that poses an imminent hazard.198 
III. The Need for More Process in Dispersant Regulation 
 In light of the unprecedented application of dispersants in re-
sponse to the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster, it is necessary to recon-
sider the use of dispersants within the national emergency response 
framework.199 A FIFRA-like, front-end regulatory framework would be 
tremendously valuable in addressing the dearth of information on dis-
persants and their toxicity.200 This increase of information would help 
the EPA perform more holistic cost-benefit analyses and would ensure 
that dispersant application is scrutinized before it is carried out.201 The 
argument for requiring additional process for the use of dispersants is 
even more compelling given the extremely inadequate preparation of 
an emergency oil spill response in the BP Deepwater Horizon disas-
ter.202 Notably, the then-existing regulations al
of ell over a half-million gallons of dispersants in the Gulf before the 
                                                                                                                      
193 7 U.S.C. § 136d(c)(2). 
e 7 U.S.C. § 136d(c)(1), (3), (4). 
t 301. 
 892, 901 (E.D. Mich. 1979). 
bcasts.view&id=40a4095 
e-d5 0 minutes). 
194 Angelo, supra note 10, at 170; se
195 Miller, supra note 165, a
196 7 U.S.C. § 136d(c)(3). 
197 Dow Chem. Co. v. Blum, 469 F. Supp.
198 See Miller, supra note 165, at 300–01. 
199 See Dispersant Working Paper, supra note 4, at 1. The need for reconsideration of the 
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EPA concluded that the dispersant being applied was no better or 
worse than any other chemical alternatives.203 
 Ultimately, a FIFRA-like, front-end regulatory framework for dis-
persants would better fulfill the congressional intent behind the Na-
tio m 
ss
 characterizing the regulation of dispersants as front-end 
may be disingenuous.210 As the NCP Product Schedule concedes, list-
is not any type of validation by the 
PA
     
nal Contingency Plan (NCP)— “to protect the environment fro
po ible deleterious effects caused by the application or use” of emer-
gency response products.204 
A. The Advantages of a Front-End Regulatory Framework for Dispersants 
 Front-end regulatory frameworks control market access of the 
product by limiting its ability to enter into commerce.205 To some de-
gree, dispersant regulation already falls within this characterization.206 
To be listed on the NCP Product Schedule, tests measuring the prod-
uct’s effectiveness are required by the EPA.207 Further, toxicity tests for 
dispersants meeting the effectiveness requirement are mandated.208 
Manufacturers must provide this information before a dispersant can 
be placed on the NCP Product Schedule and made available for pre-
authorized use within a Regional Contingency Plan (RCP) and on-the-
spot use at the discretion of the Federal On-Site Coordinator (OSC).209 
Neverthelesss,
ing of a dispersant on the Schedule 
E ; rather, it is only proof that certain data requirements have merely 
been submitted.211 
1. Resolving Information Gaps 
 A true front-end regulatory structure, like the kind employed in 
FIFRA, would alleviate the current glaring informational deficiencies 
regarding dispersant application. A FIFRA-like framework would shift 
the burden of producing information about the dispersant to the pro-
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ducer.212 The EPA could, as it does in FIFRA, require the producer to 
relinquish all data that may be necessary to protect the environment 
and human health from harm caused by dispersants.213 Thus, the EPA 
would enjoy access to a greater amount of information concerning the 
dispersant by simply requiring it during the registration process.214 The 
EPA could also apply the data requirements to the dispersant as a whole, 




forming the NCP Product Schedule into an authorizing or licensing 
ccess to dispersants not fulfilling 
ci t and inclusive concerning matters of public health and the envi-
ronment.215 This certainly would have saved the EPA from needing to 
conduct dispersant toxicity tests well after a half-million gallons of dis-
persants had been applied in the Gulf.216 
 A front-end regulatory framework would also modify the current 
NCP Product Schedule. As it currently exists, the NCP Product Schedule 
does not serve as an approval or certification from the EPA.217
le  because use of the dispersants is predicated on their placement in 
the NCP Product Schedule—at least for pre-authorized use and on-site 
use decisions made by the OSC—listing of dispersants allows for their 
ultimate de facto introduction into the market and society.218 
 A front-end system requires the regulating agency to have the abil-
ity to restrict access to the market,219 much like the NCP Product 
Schedule does for dispersants in non-emergency situations.220 By trans-
medium, the EPA could limit market a
required criteria.221 This ability would give the EPA the enforcement 
mechanism to ensure that its information requirements are satisfied.222 
2. An Improved Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 Addressing informational gaps would also improve the cost-benefit 
analysis undertaken by the EPA in emergency response scenarios.223 
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The current requirements for listing a dispersant on the NCP Product 
Schedule do not include vital issues “such as environmental persistence, 
effectiveness with multiple varieties of oil and at multiple temperatures, 
byproducts, and endocrine effects.”224 The confidential business infor-
mation exception in the dispersant listing process compounds this situa-
tion.225 For example, the Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) for Corexit 
products identifies “organic sulfonic acid salts” as a component, yet does 
not provide any specifics.226 There are several compounds which may 
constitute the “organic” component, and without this knowledge it is 
ecision to use dispers-
ts.
ersants.234 By 
requiring this information from the outset, the EPA can include it as a 
factor in its decision to approve or disapprove RCPs, and its ultimate 
                                                             
impossible to accurately consider and forecast potential long-term envi-
ronmental and public health effects of dispersant use.227 Further, com-
ponents of a dispersant may be listed generally, rather than by specific 
chemical ingredient.228 Corexit 9500 lists “hydrotreated light distil-
late[s]” as one of the ingredients on its MSDS.229 
 This vague terminology prevents accurate assessment of potential 
effects of dispersant use on human health and the affected ecosystem, 
and thus impairs any cost-benefit analysis of the d
an 230 It also precludes interested individuals from inputting their 
own studies and analyses for the EPA’s consideration in deciding to list 
the chemical or not, as there is insufficient specificity of information to 
conduct appropriate scientific examinations, thereby impairing outside 
contribution to the EPA’s cost-benefit analysis.231 
 A FIFRA-like, front-end regulatory framework specifically con-
templates a cost-benefit analysis that accounts for a variety of factors.232 
In order to achieve this end, the FIFRA framework requires that the 
manufacturer of pesticides submit information supporting registra-
tion.233 Likewise, a front-end system for dispersants could increase the 
data available to make an informed decision to use disp
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d sion to list the product on the NCP Product Schedule.eci
he riskier dispersants before, 
rather than after, their application.239 Shifting the uncertainty from a 
ework is 
ther, an internet site provided in the plan that 
pp
235 This would 
be a significant improvement to the EPA conducting tests on dispersants 
after they have already been applied in mass quantities.236 
 The provision of additional information about dispersants within a 
front-end framework, thus improving the EPA’s cost-benefit analysis, is 
consistent with the NCP’s goal of decreasing the potential adverse im-
pact of oil spills and hazardous substance releases.237 Therefore, front-
end regulation of dispersants would be in accord with existing federal 
policy.238 It would also diminish some of the uncertainty involved in 
emergency spill response situations; by virtue of the information re-
quirements, a front-end strategy identifies t
reactive to proactive position within a front-end regulatory fram
superior to the current NCP listing model. 
3. Mitigating an Agency’s Lack of Scrutiny of Response Plans 
 The NCP, in response to an oil spill, should unify both RCPs and 
the responsible party’s response plan.240 Although the CWA directly 
incorporates the use of dispersants in an emergency response,241 the 
presence of the dispersant on the NCP Product Schedule and incorpo-
ration into authorized RCPs and responsible party response plans 
makes dispersant application a reality.242 These response plans, how-
ever, are generally not scrutinized.243 For example, BP included seals 
and walruses, species that are not present in the Gulf, in its response 
plan for a spill at the Macondo wellhead.244 BP’s response plan was in-
formed by an expert who had been dead for several years at the time 
the plan was filed.245 Fur
su orted BP’s position was, in reality, a Japanese entertainment site.246 
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Such lack of attention both in the production and confirmation of 
these plans is alarming. 
 One way to address this lack of attention is to employ a front-end 
regulatory framework. Again, by controlling the dispersants within a 
front-end framework, it is possible to limit or eliminate their market 
access.247 Given the minimal scrutiny applied to federal, local, and pri-
vate response plans, this limitation upon market access would ensure 
that the plans could not contain response chemicals that are inconsis-
tent with the NCP and federal policy.248 In this way, the EPA could scru-
tinize dispersants before they are even considered as part of a response 
plan, thereby mitigating potential detrimental effects.249 Use of a front-
end regulatory framework for dispersants thus ensures that the poten-
tial deleterious effects of dispersant application are contemplated at the 
listing onse 
lan
ill promote a decrease in their use in oil 
spill responses.253 Such weaknesses may give pause to adopting a similar 
r, for reasons discussed 
                                                                                                                     
stage, well before a dispersant’s inclusion within a resp
p .250 Because there are only nineteen dispersants currently listed on 
the Product Schedule, this will not dramatically affect the EPA’s regula-
tory responsibility.251 
B. Addressing Weaknesses in a FIFRA-like Front-End Framework 
 Proposing a FIFRA-like framework for the regulation of dispers-
ants is not a blanket recommendation of FIFRA’s entire regulatory ap-
proach. Notably, despite FIFRA’s enactment, continuing animal and 
ecological diversity is threatened in part as a result of pesticide use.252 
Additionally, FIFRA is not designed to minimize pesticide use or appli-
cation, and it is unlikely that adoption of a similar front-end regulatory 
framework for dispersants w
regulatory structure for dispersants; howeve
above, a front-end framework would dramatically improve the informa-
tional deficiencies, and thus the decision-making calculus in emergency 
oil spill response situations. 
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1. A Lack of Incentive to Limit Chemical Use 
 The major policy motivations behind the 1972 amendments to FI-
FRA addressed environmental concerns, centering largely on the DDT 
controversy and Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring.254 FIFRA, however, has 
done little to limit modern pesticide usage.255 Pesticide use increased 
by 170 percent between 1964 and 1982.256 FIFRA is not designed to en-
courage effective or efficient pesticide usage.257 
 It is not clear, however, that incentivizing minimal or efficient dis-
persant usage within a dispersant regulatory framework will be appro-
priate or even worthwhile. First, there have only been roughly two 
hundred uses of dispersants in the last forty-three years,258 whereas bil-
lions of pounds of pesticides are manufactured and applied annually in 
the United States.259 Second, dispersant usage is contemplated with 
regard to emergency spill response,260 unlike pesticide application, 
which is utilized as an everyday solution to pest control.261 Because fed-
eral legislation and regulation contemplates dispersant application only 
in rare circumstances, promoting effective or efficient dispersant usage 
is less of a concern than in pesticide application. Although concern 
over efficient application of dispersants is merited given the unknown 
-
pla ontemplate dispersant application in specific instances— 
“unreasonable adverse effects on the environment” analysis within its 
determination of whether to register a pesticide, and thus allow its in-
                                                                                                                     
effects of dispersants on human and ecosystem health, efficient applica
tion concerns would be more appropriately addressed within those 
ns that c
Regional Contingency Plans, Area Contingency Plans, and responsible 
party response plans.262 
2. Problems Posed by the Unreasonable Risk Standard & Cost-Benefit 
Analysis 
 One weakness of a FIFRA-like framework is its incorporation of an 
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troduction to the market.263 Unfortunately, regulation based upon risk 
is inherently open-ended.264 As a result, it entails balancing many unre-
ted
s roughly nineteen thousand.268 The fact that the EPA at-
IFRA-like regulatory 
framework should be used to address the information gaps that cur-
rently exist in dispersant reg roviding the opportunity to 
nga
la  variables, which ultimately creates a case-by-case decision-making 
process.265 This type of approach may result in administrative chal-
lenges for the EPA.266 
 Potential dispersant regulation, however, would not be nearly as 
burdensome as pesticide regulation given the number of each respec-
tive product type currently on the market. The EPA’s updated NCP 
Product Schedule contains nineteen dispersants, and ninety-four total 
chemical products, that could be used in emergency oil spill 
cleanup.267 The number of pesticides registered in the United States, 
however, i
tempts to control market access of some nineteen thousand pesticides 
supports the proposition that it could handle an additional nineteen 
chemical products. 
 An additional concern with a FIFRA-like framework is its cost-
benefit analysis. It is unclear, or even unlikely, that cost-benefit analysis 
within environmental regulation includes many of the benefits to pub-
lic health and the environment that are not easily quantifiable in eco-
nomic terms.269 Furthermore, the use of a cost-benefit analysis is trou-
bling given the information gap in regulatory decision making.270 
Reconciling the weaknesses of a cost-benefit analysis is not the purpose 
of this Note; however, the adoption of a front-end F
ulation, thus p
e ge in a more accurate cost-benefit analysis.271 
Conclusion 
 Dispersants thundered into the public eye in the wake of the BP oil 
spill disaster. The unprecedented volume of dispersants applied and 
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e United 
ate
g the product before it ever appears on the market.278 
Because a front-end framework for dispersants is superior to the exist-
ing method of dispersant regulation, it should be pursued in light of 
the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster and all of its known and unknown 
consequences. 
                                                                                                                     
the uncertainty concerning their potential negative effects on the pub-
lic health and the environment provide more than ample reason to ad-
dress the existing dispersant regulatory structure (or lack thereof).272 
Such uncertainty and unpreparedness is in opposition to the prevailing 
policy motivations behind both the creation of the EPA and the NCP.273 
FIFRA, a front-end framework used to regulate pesticides in th
St s, provides a worthwhile model for dispersant regulation going 
forward.274 While FIFRA is by no means the pinnacle of regulatory effi-
ciency and success, its front-end structure would prove valuable to an 
increased federal regulation of dispersants within the NCP.275 
 A front-end framework like FIFRA’s would address the informa-
tional deficiencies present in the BP oil disaster.276 Further, such a 
structure would allow for a more accurate and inclusive cost-benefit 
analysis on behalf of emergency responders.277 Finally, the nature of a 
front-end framework decreases possible risk to the public by addressing 
and investigatin
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